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BOOK REVIEWS
By Homer H. Clark, Jr. St. Paul,
Pp. XIX, 754. $12.00.
1968.
Co.,
Minn.: West Publishing

LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS.

During the 1966 annual meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools, one of the speakers at the Roundtable on Family Law
resolutely predicted that:
We are on the threshold of a revolution in the teaching of family law, a
revolution that will parallel the dramatic reshaping of the teaching of
criminal law that has occurred in the past ten years ....

Those who enter

the family law area from criminal law specialization-and their number is
increasing-cannot help but feel dissatisfied with a 'domestic relations'
course shaped traditionally by those whose interest in the area is an outgrowth of a specialization in contracts, property or torts. The dissatisfaction
of the newcomers will both be the cause of and determine the direction of
the new movement in family law teaching. 1

At first reckoning, Professor Clark's new textbook does not seem
to be attuned to this new movement. It even retains the old "Domestic
Relations" terminology in its title, and both its basic content and its
arrangement of materials are in the traditional mold. As would be
expected, the subject arrangement follows very closely the author's
own conventional casebook, which was published three years earlier;
furthermore, the new text does not differ radically in form and coverage from the Madden hornbook, which dates back to 1931. These two
companion works of Professor Clark, concentrating largely on legal
problems and principles, offer a sharp contrast to the materials recently
published by Professors Goldstein and Katz under the title of The
Family and The Law-Problems for Decision in Family Law Process,2
and hailed as a work in which "[t]he authors in their discussion of
family-law problems, bring into scrutiny data from many disciplinespsychology, philosophy, law, political science, genetics, religion,
anthropology, medicine, geriatrics, econompsychoanalysis, sociology,
3
work."
social
and
ics
The foregoing observations are not offered in derogation of Professor Clark's product. Quite the contrary, he has served the "new movement" well by providing a good, old-fashioned legal textbook, which
is much needed to complement the recent out-pouring of good, newfashioned, inter-disciplinary teaching materials. 4 Because of the
1. George, New DirectionsIn Family Law Teaching, 20 J. OF

LEGAL ED.

567 (1968).

2. Published by The Free Press, New York (1965).
3. From the front flap of the dust jacket of J. GOLDS=r & J. KATZ, THE FArmY
FAmY LAW PnocESs (1965).
AND T=E LAW-PROBLEMS FOR DECISION IN =
4. In addition to J. GOLDSTEn & J. KATZ, supra note 3, see M. PLOSCOWE &
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extensive scope of the subject matter included in the traditional family
law course, most teachers have long found it impossible to give adequate classroom attention to several sections of the casebook and have
had to rely on collateral reading to bring those topics within their
courses. It seems certain that students engaged in the current
sociologically-psychologically oriented study of family law on the
problem basis will need to turn frequently to conventional text material to acquaint themselves with the large body of legal rules and
principles relevant to this branch of the law. Further, the attorney
not regularly engaged in family law practice must call upon textbooks
to give him the background and the initial authorities upon which
to base his research. Clark's up-to-date and carefully written new
hornbook is well designed to meet these needs of teachers, students
and practitioners.
Faced with the difficulty of covering such a broad segment of the
law in a single-volume work, the author acknowledges the commonly
assumed "provincial nature of domestic relations law," but strongly
discounts that assumption as being based on conditions of an
earlier era which have been substantially modified by a modern trend
toward greater uniformity of state law in this field. Rather than
finding the still-considerable diversity of state domestic relations law
to be a severe obstacle to the writing of a short text on the subject,
Professor Clark accepts the challenge to promote further uniformity.
He attempts to do this by frequent forthright expression of disagreement with established legal principles, by stating his usually wellreasoned choices between divergent points of view on numerous issues,
and by venturing to suggest "the directions in which the law ought to
5
move" at a number of points.
My above comparative reference to Madden's hornbook is not intended to imply lack of scope or absence of originality in Clark's book.
The contents of chapter one ("Breach of Promise and Other PreMarital Controversies"), chapter three ("The Suit to Annul"), chapter
four ("Domicile in Domestic Relations"), chapter eleven ("Jurisdiction
for Divorce, Alimony and Custody"), and chapter thirteen ("Divorce
Procedure") are dealt with only lightly, if at all, in Madden's text.
Separation agreements, which are accorded only four pages in
Madden, are the subject of a full chapter of fifty pages in the new
book; adoption, covered in one section in the earlier text, is now the
D. FREED, FAMILY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS (1963); C. FOOTE, R. LEVY &
F. SANDERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAw (1966); F. HARPER & J. SKOLNCK,
PROBLEMS OF TE FAMILY (rev. ed. 1962); R. LEVY, SELECTED MATERIALS ON FAMILY
LAW: CUSTODY, THE UNmVER MoTIIE,
ADOPTION, PARENTAL NEGLECT, NATIONAL
COUNcm ON LEGAL CLINqcs (1964).

5. H. CLAPam, LAW OF DoMESTIc RELATIONS Xi (1968).
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subject of an entire chapter of some seventy pages; and the discussion
of protection of rights of consortium is also greatly extended. On the
other hand, the subjects of "Guardian and Ward" and "Infants, Persons
Non Compotes Mentis, and Aliens," to which nearly one-third of the
Madden text is devoted, are entirely omitted or only brushed lightly
in the new book.
Of course, any new text is expected to give especial attention to
recent developments in the field, and a perusal of the Clark hornbook,
while not disclosing major revisions in family law concepts, does
demonstrate that numerous changes of more limited scope have been
wrought during the past generation. Thus, one finds an extensive
coverage of "heart balm" legislation of the 1930's, which abolished
causes of action for breach of contract to marry and alienation of
affections. Similarly, discussions are included of such recently significant matters as, for example, the widespread adoption of the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Support Act, the incidence of marriage by proxy, increasing recognition of the wife's right to recover
for loss of consortium resulting from injury to the husband, substantial
liberalization of the rules regarding tort liability between members
of the family, recognition of incompatibility as a ground for divorce,
and the gradual weakening of the doctrine of recrimination as a
defense in divorce actions. Throughout the book, modern casespost-World-War-II decisions-are consistently prominent in the citation of authorities.
On the other hand, there has been a substantial reduction in the
attention given to outdated matters regarding the rights and liabilities
of married women in relation to property and contracts. The entire
subject of the legal position of married women is covered in a tenpage chapter. While this revision spares the reader of most of the
tedious details of the common law disabilities of coverture, which are
of historical interest but which because of statutory reform have long
since ceased to be significant to the practicing lawyer, this curtailment may have been too severe in some respects, reducing the usefulness of the book in both the law school and the law office. For
example, tenancies by the entirety are dealt with in one-third of a
sentence, and community property is accorded the same treatment.
This strikes me as being a summary dismissal of matters which are
of some importance in current family problems; but apparently Professor -Clark views these topics as more appropriate for coverage in
property law texts, as they may well be. The point is illustrative,
of course, of one of the difficulties inherent in trying to fix the boundaries of the family law field, whether in teaching a law school course
or in writing a legal textbook, because the subject cuts across many
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other areas of the law and much of the material could logically be
covered by teachers and writers in torts, contracts, criminal law,
property conflict of laws, and equity, among others. .If Clark has perhaps, in some aspects, limited the scope, of his
work too much, he has, conversely, included numerous comments
which will serve to enhance the readers' comprehension of legal
problems which ordinarily might not be considered a part of family
law, but which will frequently confront the lawyer in this area of
practice. For example, the conflict of laws aspects of actions for
breach of contracts to marry and of cases involving the validity of
common law marriages are given considerable attention. Also, evidence problems relating to proving that a contract to marry was
actually made and that an agreement to enter a common law marriage
existed are noted in some detail.
As a final observation, I would commend the literary style of this
book, which provides easy reading and is generally comprehensible
even for the uninitiated layman. Professor Clark expresses himself
with clarity and conciseness, without bombast or undue use of legal
jargon. He is capable of inserting the light touch of humor in the
midst of a weighty discussion, and he has peppered his writings with
phrases which, while somewhat unlawyerlike, nevertheless serve to
convey his ideas effectively. 6 Furthermore, he is consistently grammatical (I find not one split infinitive in the entire volume) and
has apparently given careful attention to sentence structure. While
these factors may not establish his legal scholarship-about which I
think there is no doubt-they do demonstrate his capability of putting
the fruits of that scholarship into a highly palatable form.
T. A.

SMEDLEY*

6. For example, in discussing the issue of whether disease contracted by the
defendant may constitute a valid excuse for his refusal to carry out his promise to
marry the plaintiff, he states: "New Jersey seems to adopt the un-Christian rule that
the disease must make marriage or consummation impossible before it will be a defense."
(Emphasis added). Id. at 9 n.30.
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.

=rE SociAL ROLE OF SCIENCE. Harry W. Jones, Editor. New
York: Rockefeller University Press, 1967. Pp. 243. $6.00.

LAW AND

In April, 1965, Rockefeller University joined-with the Walter E.
Meyer Research Institute of Law to hold a conference on Law and
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the Social Role of Science. A distinguished panel of speakers discoursed for two days before an equally distinguished audience of
some 80 persons, carefully selected because of anticipated contribution to the unique program arranged for the occasion. The nine papers
published in the volume under review were presented at this conference.
The management assembled a galaxy of stars on the panel, and
the volume sets forth the fruits of their knowledge and perception.
They take long steps toward identifying and bridging the interdisciplinary gap between science and the law. Professor David P. Cavers
of Harvard Law School opens the series with a catalogue of "points
of confrontation" between law and science. He sees the adjudicatory
function as one of the points of confrontation; for example, in personal injury litigation, with medical witnesses on the stand, and in
criminal proceedings, with psychiatrists testifying pro and con. Also,
he suggests as points of confrontation the areas of the law that are
undergoing rapid change, where existing legal doctrines demand
re-examination in the light of current social needs, as in workmen's
compensation laws, zoning laws, and the law of privacy, so radically
affected by modem electronics. He also finds confrontation in certain
novel areas where science is creating new hazards for mankind to
endure, as in the development of new drugs for the ill and new
pesticides to eliminate unwanted insect life. In addition, he finds
confrontation problems in de.ising the legal means of allocating scarce
resources for expensive research and development, as in high energy
physics with its price tag in the hundreds of millions, and in the
elimination of air and water pollution. Finally, he takes note of
international relationships with their test-ban treaties and other interdisciplinary complexities. In these and other areas, Professor Cavers
observes that "the lawyer and the scientist will have to resolve many
problems of concern to both," and "with this in prospect, it is high
time that we learn to work together, so we can get on with these
jobs."
Following this lead, Professor Arthur W. Murphy of Columbia
University Law School discusses the relationship of administrative
law to government-supported research, a sizeable item of fifteen billion
dollars per year. He notes that "[W]here large sums are involved,
red tape will flourish. . . . If the scientist will realize that some
bureaucracy must accompany the use of any federal funds, and if the
administration will keep in mind the objectives of governmental
support of research, a good start will have been made toward bridging
the communication gap." Professor Bernard Wolfman of the University of Pennsylvania Law School lays out the subject of tax preferences
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favoring science. This again involves the confrontation of law and
scientific activities through: exemption from taxes on the income
of scientific organizations, exemption of scholarship grants, treatment
of research expenses as current expenses (or at least as being subject
to the five year write-off provisions) and, finally, the application of
capital gains rates to patent royalties. The author feels that such
exceptions and preferences are often questionable. They serve to
"damage the integrity of the tax system," and they should be
allowed only wheia the reasons are most compelling. They should not
be granted just because they are the "easy way."
Professors Joe H. Munster, Jr., and Justin C. Smith of Western
Reserve focus on "project research" in universities, -that is, research
sponsored and supported fiscally either by private enterprise or by
government, with the inevitable dilution of the educational potentialities of university life. Such research is not free from current criticism.
Finally, Professor Ovid C. Lewis, also of Western Reserve, deals with
the difficult subject of medical experimentation on human beings, a
subject of extraordinary sensitivity when it involves "normal" humans
as distinguished from patients requiring therapy, especially if the
normals are children or mental defectives unable to give informed
consent. The foregoing five papers make up Part I, entitled "Where
Law and Science Meet." The contacts-the points of "confrontation"are legion.
Then comes Part II, "Towards Interdisciplinary Understanding."
Here we embark upon a largely uncharted course, and the seas are
not always calm. Again, it is worthwhile to summarize. John Gordon
Palfrey, Commissioner, United States Atomic Energy Commission,
leads the way. Of the five members of the Commission, three are
scientists and two are lawyers, but all work together with a mixed
bag of problems involving both law and science, ranging from the
development of massive nuclear weapons to irradiation of the tiny
trichina spiralis (organisms that sometimes cause trichinosis from
improperly cooked pork). The "colleagueship" on the Commission
is successful in carrying out the practical operations of the multibillion dollar atomic enterprise.
Following Commissioner Palfrey, Oscar M. Ruebhausen, an eminent
New York lawyer, joins with Oliver G. Brim, Jr., President of the
Russell Sage Foundation and a sociologist, in presenting probably the
most sophisticated piece in the entire volume, "Privacy and Behavioral
Research." So that we may protect the right of individuals in a free
society to the sole possession of their own personalities, they discuss
the need for establishing an "equilibium " between the interests of
society in an electronic era which makes available to investigators
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so many highly technical tools capable of invading privacy in numerous subtle ways. The problem of too little versus too much is upon
us in the area of behavioral research, and the authors suggest that
the time has arrived for the adoption of a code of ethics for this
field. Indeed, they suggest seven principles that should be covered
in such a code.
Ruebhausen and Brim are followed by Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr.,
another sociologist and an official of Russell Sage, who discusses the
program followed by the Foundation in developing so wisely its
support for interdisciplinary research in law and sociology. Under
this program investigators in the two fields have moved "well beyond
the ad hoc bits and pieces phase of cross-disciplinary work toward a
much more systematic and solid bridging of the gap between law
and social science."
Finally, the volume concludes with a sagacious paper by the editor
himself, Professor Harry W. Jones, Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence
on the Columbia Law Faculty, who urges emphasis upon massive
social science inquiry quite apart from its possible "practical applications." Let us not expect practical results too soon. "Law," he says,
"as a great social technology and control system, has even more
to
gain, in a long run view of things, from the perfection of the social
sciences as 'basic' sciences than from such immediate applications
of social science methods and insights as may be helpful to the law
from time to time as the social disciplines move toward scientific
maturity." This is the doctrine that Harry Jones at one time preached
so vigorously at the American Bar Foundation, although the Foundation was not then sufficiently mature to act upon it.
. Additionally, the book contains a useful 65 page selective bibliography on law and science, designed to highlight and illustrate the
major areas of literary concern, taken mostly from the American
scene.
How does one evaluate a volume such as Law and the Social
Role 6f Science? It is no easy task. In some respects the multitude
of ideas expressed by the nine authors resemble the well-filled shelves
of a supermarket. The rather overwhelming breadth as well as depth
of what Dr. Cottrell calls "the bits and pieces" of law vis-a-vis science
which are revealed in the volume tend to leave the reader afloat on
a boundless sea. Yet, on a second reading, the philosophical highlights begin to stand out with notable clarity. We identify the
principal "points of confrontation" of law and science; we note the
need of the legal order for light to help shape the law, the light to be
drawn from the more profound depths of social science research in
shaping the law of the future; we see a seamy side of commercialized
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confrontation, as in the tax preferences, a side to be minimized so
far as possible; we are told to seek an "equilibrium" between too much
and too little of government and administration in the field; and above
all, we must avoid too hasty conclusions, based upon immature social
science research. The nine papers in the volume taken together cause
the careful reader to think about the need for communication, as
well as the mere fact of confrontation. I could have wished that there
might also have been papers from men of the natural sciences-for
example, a George W. Beadle or a Glenn Seaborg. This would have
introduced other facets of the matter. Yet nine were quite enough
for two days. Law and the Social Role of Science is well worth both
reading and reflection.
Over forty years of this reviewer's teaching of law-including some
years of seminars in "law and science" coupled with several "interdisciplinary" ventures, the latest being in urban affairs collaborating
with political scientists, economists, and sociologists-lead me to offer
just one thought about the central theme of this volume, which concerns bridging the gap between law and the social sciences. I recall
that Pasteur observed that "chance favors the prepared mind." In
the process of bridging disciplinary gaps, there is no substitute for
the well-forged, well-equipped mind. Legislators who shape the laws
of the body politic increasingly turn to the research fraternity for
solutions. Executives do likewise. Legislators, executives, and research
staff alike need interdisciplinary wisdom acquired through teaching,
studying, and research, as well as through action in the field. In
these ways the bridges will gradually be built between law and
science. Yet it will require long years and infinite patience to develop
the "prepared mind" and to reach the goal.
Then finally, I have wished that the volume might have been
called The Social Role of Law and Science, rather than Law and the
Social Role of Science, but this is, of course, merely a personal choice.
E.
*Frank C. Rand Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.

BLYTiE STASON*

